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Harry Truman’s succession to the United States presidency upon Franklin 
Roosevelt’s death in 1945 thrust an obscure and inexperienced politician into 
the center of one of the 20th century’s most critical historical moment: the final 
months of World War II, as the United States was preparing to deploy nuclear 
weapons for the first time. Truman’s clear unequalness (in both image and 
substance) to the tasks at hand, in juxtaposition with the epic scale of the tasks 
themselves, provides a unique exposure of the illusory nature of presidential 
authority in the Nuclear Age. Using Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan as a means of 
delineating the theory and image of political sovereignty, this essay examines 
three distinct moments from the early days of Truman’s administration that serve 
to elucidate the absence of presidential power and control that continues to this 
day to underlie the media apparatus that defines the American presidency.
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Introduction
Screens both reveal and hide, 
as Freud (1899) has shown us – a 
lesson taken up by film theory for the 
subtlety of its approach to screen 
representation: as both present and 
absent, thereby revealing that the 
image, regardless of its signifying force, 
can mark an abyss as much as fill one.1 
It is in this spirit that I approach three 
inter-related moments that together 
comprise a crisis in the representation 
of power: three moments in history 
across the critical years from the use of 
nuclear weapons against the hundreds 
of thousands of Japanese residents 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the 
beginning of the “Cold War”, what 
Sheldon Wolin has called the transition 
from the “power imaginary” of World 
War II to the “new power imaginary and 
its totalizing categories” of the Cold 
War (WOLIN, 2008: 28).
The figure at the center of this 
story – but not its protagonist – is 
American president Harry S. Truman, 
the lackluster heir to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s dozen years of political 
stardom. Thrust onto the world stage 
only months after his election as Vice 
President, Truman’s unlikely role as the 
first modern president after FDR and, 
even more, the first to use the nuclear 
weapon that had been hidden within 
the bowels of the top-secret Manhattan 
project for five years – Truman’s story 
is one available for analysis using the 
tools of Cinema Studies and those 
deriving from the critique of the theory 
of the Leviathan, that figure of Thomas 
Hobbes which is both a theory and an 
image of political sovereignty.
This is the story of the screening of 
this president during the transition to 
a permanent state of war, a transition 
that was uniquely revelatory of the new 
power dynamics of the Cold War, the 
new power imaginary of the nuclear 
national security state formalized by 
NSC 68.2 It is a tale told in three acts 
of the tensions which emerged in this 
liminal moment in which power began 
to escape its localization in the figure 
of popular sovereignty, the president. 
Our three moments, in three 
different media: first, the epistolary 
portrait of Truman’s “decision” to 
deploy the nuclear bomb on the city 
of Hiroshima; second, the stunning 
drawn portrait of Truman on the cover 
of Time’s 1945 “Man of the Year” issue; 
and finally, the cinematic portrait 
conveyed in the 1947 MGM film The 
Beginning or the End (directed by 
Norman Taurog), which is unique for its 
effort to incorporate a sitting president 
into a biopic-like narrative about the 
decision to use the nuclear bomb. 
Part I: The Leviathan: Theory and 
Practice
This brief analysis seeks to begin 
to pry open the crypt of power in the 
nuclear age through an examination of 
the origins of the modern presidency 
in the United States – its “official 
aesthetics”, if you will – at the dawn of 
the nuclear age. The screening of the 
president is best approached using the 
toolkit developed in Cinema Studies 
or Screen Studies, as its sensitivity to 
both spectacle and reception provides 
an antidote to the disciplinary blinkers 
of those usually charged with studying 
the presidency – and power. 
During the past thirty years, the 
figure posited in Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan has emerged again and 
again in the work of some of our 
most powerful thinkers, from Michel 
Foucault to Giorgio Agamben, Jacques 
Derrida, and Eric Santner3 as a figure 
that is both a theory about power and a 
model of its application. 
Most discussions about the 
presidency, in whatever arena or 
discipline, whether academic or 
not, subscribe – either implicitly or 
explicitly – to the Hobbesian figure 
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9809-3900
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of the Leviathan, a figure that is also 
a philosophy, or theory: the monarch/
leader enjoys a contractual right 
to govern, presumably to protect 
the populace. Because this theory 
concerns itself only with the narrowly 
circumscribed question of the 
legitimacy of power in a juridical or 
legal sense, it obscures the ways 
in which actual power is dispersed 
throughout the social body.4 The 
discourse of the Leviathan functions 
to keep the sovereign front and center 
in ways analogous to that of the film 
star embedded within a narrative 
that improbably, yet satisfyingly, 
appears to arise from and support the 
protagonist’s prowess, authority and/
or power. “Power” masquerades across 
media, still or moving image regardless. 
Whether it appears as a royal or a 
republican body, it wears its face like 
a mask – one that supports a political 
version of a cinematic star’s narration.5
The official discourse of the 
Leviathan, whether as a critical analytic 
frame or panegyric justification, is a 
ruse. This “theory of the Leviathan”, 
as Foucault calls it, produces a 
normative orientation towards the 
narration of governmentality, one 
which sustains a celebrity-based “star” 
narration characteristic of classical 
Hollywood cinema and its reception, an 
orientation that continues to dominate 
extra-cinematic narrative today. This 
star-based approach to power also 
structures most academic and media 
approaches to the presidency, resulting 
in the personality-based explanations 
we have grown to expect – and trust. 
These narrative frames are, in turn, 
mimicked by the mass media.6
The frontispiece from the original 
1651 edition of Hobbes’s Leviathan 
provides what Horst Bredekamp 
has described as “one of the most 
authoritative answers imaginable to 
the experience of inescapable chaos 
and years of civil war” (BREDEKAMP, 
2007: 255)7 and nicely conveys the 
protection the Leviathan promises. 
Further, this interplay of spectatorship 
and sovereignty is long-standing, 
as is the often-forgotten temporal 
dimension of the Leviathan’s power 
that so fascinated Carl Schmitt and 
fueled his endorsement of the “state 
of emergency” (which characterized 
nearly the entirety of Hitler’s term 
of office) and that, as we have seen 
since 9-11, has become the norm. Even 
more, the “Cold War”, inaugurated 
during Harry Truman’s administration 
in 1947 with the signing of NSC 68, 
institutionalized a permanent state of 
war. 
The image of the Leviathan that 
so impressed Carl Schmitt is clearly 
a scene of spectatorship. It is also 
co-constitutive, a sophisticated 
representation of a pre-cinematic 
suture, as the spectators themselves 
make up the figure they are turned 
toward. We move closer here to an 
understanding of a “portrait” that is 
also temporal, the “state of exception” 
or “emergency” that intrigued Walter 
Benjamin and Carl Schmitt as they 
encountered the rise of dictatorships 
of Mussolini and Hitler. The Leviathan 
emerges from outside of normal time 
(and the law). As such, he is decisive: 
he must be “outside” to act. This may 
be the appeal of those who have sought 
to occupy the Oval Office and do so by 
donning the cloak of the “outsider”, a 
strategy perfected by Ronald Reagan 
but traceable back to Eisenhower. 
Truth, as it has been refined by a neo-
liberal status quo is also, it seems, 
something the leader, or tyrant, can 
dispense with, as Stephen Greenblatt 
has shown in his study of tyranny in 
Shakespearean drama (GREENBLATT, 
2018).
The “outside” from which the 
Leviathan emerges can be temporal 
as well: this rupture of normal time 
is also a quality of the modern Cold 
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9809-3900
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The Leviathan (original frontispiece to the 1651 edition)
Detail from the original frontispiece of Hobbes’s Leviathan: “Society 
of the Spectacle”
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War presidency, with its massive 
consolidation of (secretive) power in 
the nuclear national security state’s 
arsenal of hydrogen bombs and the 
effective displacement of political 
participation (in lieu of increased 
emotional and psychological 
dependence) in matters of war and 
peace. “Time” collapses, as it becomes 
the time of nuclear war, of “duck and 
cover” and bomb shelters. Yet, in 
spite of the theory that undergirds 
the president’s authority (to use these 
weapons because there is not time to 
consult Congress), time is what the 
president does not have, although 
he holds the props of “decision”: 
the “button” or the “football”. The 
dialectic of ignorance and fear that this 
situation sustains effectively blunts 
citizens’ ability, and even their desire, 
to participate in a debate about, and 
take responsibility for, the drastic and 
ongoing political, economic, and of 
course military decisions which can, at 
any moment, be made in their name.
The Leviathan is a transpersonal, 
trans-temporal figure whose journey 
from the medieval effigy (which 
guaranteed sovereign continuity 
beyond a king’s mortality) to the 
nuclear national security state ends 
in the eclipse of normal time and, with 
it, the rule of law and the foundation 
of popular sovereignty. The modern 
presidency is co-constitutive with 
the new time of the Bomb, as the 
president is presumably the locus of 
“decision” (as provided in the theory of 
the Leviathan as a decisive, powerful, 
leader) for the launching of a nuclear 
war. The citizen is relegated to the 
position of a spectator. As Wolin writes 
of this transitional moment between 
WWII and the Cold War: “[t]he wartime 
imaginary [of World War II] was not 
abandoned after 1945 but recovered as 
a ‘Cold War’ between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. […] what was 
abandoned was all talk of participatory 
democracy.” (WOLIN, 2008: 26)
What follows is an analysis of a 
crisis in representation and in narration 
at the twinned birth of the modern 
presidency and the nuclear national 
security state: Harry Truman, the 
first Cold War “modern” American 
president, and the only one to have 
“used” the atomic bomb, was the 
transitional figure that provided a 
glimpse into The Matrix which produces 
the representation of the decisive 
president as an effect of power, but not 
its locus. My claim is that Truman did 
not “order” or “use” or “drop” the new, 
horrifying, weapon on Hiroshima (or 
Nagasaki, but that is a different, but 
equally grotesque, tale) and that this 
image was, for a brief period at the end 
of 1945 until early 1946, destabilized 
revealing, if only briefly, the abyssal 
ground of the president’s true position. 
By examining the liminal moment 
between the old and new order, 
between popular sovereignty and its 
eclipse under the biopolitical pressures 
of the nuclear national security state 
and its military-industrial complex, I 
seek to recover a historical moment 
which has been lost in the mists of 
the normative “history” of American 
presidential power. Put simply, the 
magnitude of this new technology of 
death was so extreme that even at this 
early moment in its “development” (to 
hydrogen and thermonuclear bombs), 
the eclipse of democratic control (over 
the powers of war and peace) has 
become so overdetermined it has been 
effectively rendered invisible, popping 
up on momentarily only to submerge 
again, as Paul Boyer (1985) has shown 
in his excellent periodization of public 
awareness of our nuclear arsenal in the 
postwar period. 
Part II: No More Time: “Man” of the 
Year 1945
Time’s 1945 cover offers us a potent 
signpost of the modern presidency 
and Cold War aesthetics, confirming, 
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in its destabilizing transparence, the 
dislocation of power that comprised its 
secret foundation. 
Two factors are immediately evident: 
first, that Truman’s portrait is a highly 
conventional one, wholly contained 
within the red borders of the miniature 
Time cover, the frame within a frame 
that indicates its belatedness. Truman 
is a sign of the past, of, indeed, another 
temporal order with no impact on 
the present – the new time of “live” 
immediacy which had been developing 
across the past decade with radio and, 
soon, wide-scale television. Truman 
does not have any access to this time, 
while, in contrast, the bomb does: the 
lightning bolts, fist, and bomb blast 
composite extend into and beyond 
the red border of the magazine’s 
“real” cover frame and in depth, 
violating Truman’s miniature frame, an 
effective graphic representation of the 
transgressive nature of the weapon as 
it violated conventional coordinates of 
space and time. Truman, on the other 
hand, is rigid, unaware, without energy. 
On all levels, the bomb is more vibrant 
and powerful than the man.
The nuclear bomb was dropped 
on the city of Hiroshima on August 6, 
1945. Three days later, another bomb 
was dropped on the city of Nagasaki 
(BERNSTEIN, 1977: 1-27). Whatever 
problems Time had with Truman, it 
did not overtly question that he had 
ordered the bomb dropped – and, 
indeed, the magazine had no access to 
the top-secret documents necessary 
to do so – yet everything about the 
story, like the cover portrait, radically 
questions the stability of presidential 
agency and, with it, the stability of the 
post-war world. The story begins by 
asking who might be Man of the Year, 
first eliminating all the great leaders, 
friend and foe. It reserves a special 
place for Roosevelt:
“Franklin Roosevelt, Man 
of 1932, 1934, and 1941, was 
dead, struck down with dramatic 
suddenness before he could 
witness the victory he had charted 
and planned. Had he lived, 1945 
would have been his year – the 
final flowering of American 
hope and strength which he 
had nurtured through the black 
days made blacker by American 
indecision. But now he lay in a 
grave at Hyde Park, mourned by 
the world” (TIME, 1945). 
The Time story conducts its 
hypothetical search for an adequate 
replacement for FDR, and, therefore, 
adequate to the task of harnessing the 
bomb’s power. It returns to Truman, with 
resignation:
“It was no scientist who, by 
historic accident, somewhat 
unwittingly, somewhat against 
his own will, became more than 
any other man responsible for 
the bomb, its use in 1945 and 
its future. It was an ordinary, 
uncurious man without any 
pretensions of any kind, a man of 
average size and weight, wearing 
bifocal glasses, fond of plain 
food, whiskey-&-water, and lodge 
meetings. It was Harry Truman, 
32nd President of the U.S. (TIME, 
1945)
This is a national portrait in crisis. It 
is an effort to ascribe some coherence, 
some subjective location (some human 
location?), to the events of the past 
months – to define their origin, if 
you will. While the magazine keeps 
attempting, again and again, to discern 
the face of sovereignty – even as it 
fails – there is a weakening of the force 
of this paradigm, to the point of near 
collapse.
“The Man of the Year 
personified the problem of the 
year. His very name had almost 
the force of a pun. Like most of 
mankind, he was ill prepared for 
the destiny and the responsibility 
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9809-3900
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Time Magazine Cover, December 31st 
1945
Poster of The Beginning or the End 
(Norman Taurog, 1947)
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which had been thrust upon him. 
He did not want the responsibility; 
the destiny rested awkwardly on 
his shoulders.” (TIME, 1945)
He is “true man”, he is “like 
most of mankind”, an everyman. 
This designation of an “everyman” 
reverberates on several levels: it 
is a sign of his loss of stature (his 
illegitimacy as a ruler); it conveys, as 
well, a new flattening of humanity. 
The “bomb” as a complex network of 
institutional, psychological, social, 
and political relays can be viewed as 
the new Leviathan. While it would take 
fifteen years for Dwight Eisenhower 
to say it clearly, the military-industrial 
complex had placed the bomb as 
Leviathan: six months into its rule, 
there are intimations that the bomb 
has transformed everything, “when it 
became clear that, from now on to the 
end of human history, every person 
would spend his individual life under 
the threat of [...] collective incineration 
and extinction which could come at 
any time, virtually without warning.” 
(SONTAG, 1966: 224) 
If we turn now to examine the 
historical minutae, the actual process 
which released the first atomic bomb 
on the city of Hiroshima, we can find, in 
the declassified documents eventually 
made public through the Freedom of 
Information Act, the textual basis of 
the split portrait and its editorial frame. 
The editors of Time had gleaned the 
truth from the zeitgeist, as they marked 
the transition, not only of one year to 
the next, but from one epoch to the 
next. However secret, the emergence 
of the nuclear bomb on the world stage 
overshadowed its purported masters. 
The historical record shows, when 
read closely, the abyss at the heart 
of the decision to massacre a city. It 
is worth examining, as it will provide 
the explanation for the efforts by the 
Truman administration to assert their 
version of the story, to re-institute the 
Leviathan. But first we can trace an 
epistolary trail of breadcrumbs leading 
to the most powerful release of energy 
ever seen on earth, a meager trail of 
hesitation and weakness, allowing the 
bomb’s own identity to took over. 
Part III: The Purloined “Order” 
Robert Jay Lifton writes: 
“what is especially chastening 
about the use of atomic bombs 
against those two Japanese cities 
is that the military occasion was 
routine, certainly lacking in any 
compelling necessity. National 
survival was in no way at stake. 
Even the outcome of the war was 
patently clear, and possibly the 
atomic bomb achieved no more 
by way of war goals than saving 
a few weeks’ time. Whatever 
the appraisal of the Hiroshima 
decision, there is common ground 
that it didn’t take much for the 
United States back in 1945 to leap 
across the nuclear threshold.” 
(LIFTON, 1982: 195) 
If we begin with the most spare 
chronology of this “leap”, we are 
confronted with the disconcerting 
evidence of an empty throne. How 
could such a magisterial act not come 
from a king? The enormity of the shift 
is inversely matched by the almost 
indecipherable, minute textual trail this 
metamorphosis left in its wake: this is 
its account, the literal and metaphoric 
trace of the evacuation of authority, 
of authorship, of decision, by Harry 
Truman. 
On July 7, 1945, Truman leaves by 
ship for Europe to attend the Potsdam 
meeting with Churchill and Stalin, 
arriving in Berlin on July 16, the same 
day of the successful Trinity Test in 
New Mexico. On July 21 – five days 
later – Truman is finally informed of 
the test. On July 24, a memo is written 
authorizing the use of the bomb against 
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various targets in Japan. The order is 
not from the President. On August 2, 
the President leaves by ship to return 
to the United States. While he is en 
route, the city of Hiroshima is bombed. 
These are, as they say, “just the facts”. 
Yet even the most basic facts – one 
would presume the easiest facts of all 
to establish, such as when the order 
was given by the President of the 
United States to drop a new, extremely 
powerful, top-secret weapon – and 
on whom or what – these facts are 
as elusive as “presidential authority” 
suddenly appears to be in these first, 
tremulous, months after the death of 
the giant Roosevelt. Investigation of 
the details now available show the 
actual process of this transition not 
only from Roosevelt to Truman (marked 
enough), but the transition from one 
regime to another: from democracy to 
the Cold War nuclear national security 
state and its new sovereign: the Bomb. 
A textual trail provides an epistolary 
confirmation, if you will, of the loss of 
the author, and the fugitive place of the 
“author” in the decision to slaughter 
hundreds of thousands of civilians 
merits our attention before turning, 
finally, to examine the clumsy efforts 
to re-assert presidential “authority” 
through the ineffective tools of the 
narrative cinema. 
On July 25, 1945, while still 
struggling with the difficult Potsdam 
negotiations with Winston Churchill 
and Joseph Stalin, Truman writes in his 
journal:
“This weapon is to be used 
against Japan between now and 
August 10. I have told the Sec. of 
War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that 
military objectives and soldiers 
and sailors are the target and 
not women and children. Even if 
the Japs are savages, ruthless, 
merciless and fanatic, we as 
the leader of the world for the 
common welfare cannot drop 
that terrible bomb on the old 
capital or the new. He and I are 
in accord. The target will be 
a purely military one and we 
will issue a warning statement 
asking the Japs to surrender 
[…]” (quoted in FERRELL, 1980: 
55-56).
Yet, the day before this journal 
entry, a top-secret order has been 
sent to General Carl Spaatz. It is not 
from (nor does it refer to) Truman but 
is “issued to you with the approval of 
the Secretary of War and of the Chief 
of Staff, USA”. What are the details of 
the bomb order? Is there any mention 
of Truman’s intentions, as indicated 
in his journal? Is there a directive 
regarding civilians? Is there a process 
set up to warn the Japanese? No. The 
order is written as follows: “The 509 
Composite group […] will deliver its 
first special bomb as soon as weather 
will permit visual bombing after 
about 3 August 1945.” There follows 
a list of four cities, all possible 
targets (quoted in STIMSON and 
BUNDY, 1947). The order continues by 
stating that “additional bombs will 
be delivered on the above targets as 
soon as made ready by project staff”. 
It is, in other words, an “order” to 
drop the bomb and, indeed, multiple 
bombs, as soon as they are ready, an 
authorization that has emerged from 
within belly of the multi-billion dollar 
Manhattan project, but not from the 
President. 
Nearly a week later, on July 
31st, Truman – still in Germany, 
remember – receives a telegram. It 
is from Secretary of War Stimson, 
telling him that General Groves’ 
project (the Manhattan Project) is 
progressing so fast that they need 
the President’s statement on the 
dropping of the bomb by August. 
That is the next day, they need it right 
away. General Groves’ project (the 
Manhattan Project is not General 
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Groves’ any more than it is Truman’s) is 
“proceeding faster than expected” the 
missive reads, breathlessly. We sense 
a reference to some kind of entity, 
some agency, something proceeding, 
speeding up, out of control. Is there any 
doubt as to the sovereign autonomy of 
the Bomb here, the autonomy of the 
two-billion-dollar Manhattan Project 
that preceded Truman by five years 
(and kept secret from him even after 
becoming president)? This “project”, 
which has occupied every component 
of the government, has done so in 
secret, and it is this entity that now 
asserts its authority – its speed. Things 
are moving fast, we must stay with 
the text, such as it is, with language, 
now almost lost beneath the crushing 
weight of a new temporality. 
Truman has, it appears, earlier 
approved a statement to be released 
when the Bomb is used. It is worth 
repeating, for this history is a muddy 
textual morass, that this statement was 
not the order itself, but the presidential 
explanation to be conveyed to the 
public in the aftermath of the Bomb’s 
use. Yet, from Stimson’s telegram 
we see that it has been revised. He’s 
not sure he can let Truman see the 
revised statement: “I will appreciate 
your authority to have White House 
release revised statement [recall, 
not yet seen by Truman] as soon 
as necessary.” He closes with this 
apology: “Sorry circumstances seem to 
require this emergency action.” There 
is a transfer of authority. Stimson will 
“appreciate [Truman’s] authority”. 
The revised statement, not seen by 
Truman, will be released as soon as 
“necessary”. Truman’s reply to Stimson 
is telegraphic, even for a telegram. 
Yet the breathlessness of all of this 
rushed, half-articulated pseudo-
communication has no cause: there 
is no impending attack, invasion or 
any other factor calling for this kind 
of (emergency) speed, yet Truman’s 
response to Stimson is a hastily 
written note on both sides of the 
original telegram: there is not a new 
telegram, not a dictated message to 
his secretary, as a text its status is 
a partial trail of breadcrumbs, less 
than a post-card, a bit more than a 
shopping list. “See over” is scribbled 
on the front side of Stimson’s 
telegram, and on the other side is 
scrawled, as if in great haste: “Sec. 
War. Reply to your 41011 suggestions 
approved Release when ready but not 
sooner than August 2. HST.”
Let us step back for a moment and 
consider what is happening here: the 
President has at some point earlier 
approved a statement, or, no, he has 
approved the release of a statement 
“by” him – but which he has not 
read. The approval of the release of 
the statement is also understood 
by Stimson to be a simultaneous 
open-ended approval of the Bomb’s 
deployment, in complete contrast 
to Truman’s own carefully described 
parameters in his journal. It must be 
noted, as well, that the horrific new 
weapon does not merit any proper 
reference: it is literally absent from 
the sentence, “Release when ready...” 
It is clearly the driving force of events, 
yet cannot be named. 
The “release” of the statement 
will take place after the “release” of 
the bomb. General Groves’ project, 
the Bomb, is, well, in a hurry. It 
appears that the determination 
regarding when this weapon will 
be used is governed by when it 
will be completed – it is internal 
to the mechanism – the Bomb 
– and its institutional support – 
the Manhattan Project, “General 
Groves’ project” – but soon to be 
transformed into the nuclear national 
security state, not governed from 
without, by executive authority, 
popular sovereignty – democracy. 
The fugitive nature of this “decision” 
is indicated in this telegraphic and 
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partial text, which refuses complete 
sentences or even a full signature. 
The illusion of presidential power 
in regard to the Bomb: this will all 
become later. There is not (yet) the 
apparatus to simulate control, such 
as the “button” (his “finger on the 
button”) which is also represented by 
the briefcase or “football” containing 
launch codes which is carried by a 
special agent who follows the president 
everywhere. What we see here – and 
it is barely visible, nestled in Truman’s 
presidential archives, there for all to 
see but, like Edgar Allan Poe’s purloined 
letter, unnoticed, is merely the trace 
of a massive, multi-layered shift 
occurring from democracy to the Cold 
War military industrial complex and 
what Sheldon Wolin names “inverted 
totalitarianism” (2008). 
Truman then receives a letter from 
Stimson, delivered by courier. Truman 
will be presented with the revisioned 
statement (and no mention of his 
editing this...). There is still no date, 
no target, none of the usual signs of 
decision; rather, Stimson writes again 
about the lack of time:
“Attached are two copies of 
the [revised] statement which 
has been prepared for release by 
you as soon as the new weapon 
is used […] The reason for the 
haste is that I was informed 
only yesterday that, weather 
permitting, it is likely that the 
weapon will be used as early as 
August 1, Pacific Ocean Time, 
which as you know is a good many 
hours ahead of Washington time.” 
(STIMSON, 1945: 181).
This time, Stimson reminds 
Truman of global time. But there is no 
conventional time in this new time of 
the Bomb: the mechanism of decision is 
sweeping past both men “responsible” 
for the use of this weapon; the bomb 
might be ready by August 1, Pacific 
Ocean Time – indeed, many hours 
ahead of Washington time. Though 
the one thing Truman has managed to 
clearly direct on his scribbled note is 
that the bomb should not be dropped 
before August 2, Stimson seems to 
have been unable to read even this tiny 
incursion of Truman’s agency. Yet this is 
not a story of insubordination: Stimson 
and Truman are not protagonists here, 
but rather props.
Part IV: The failed re-assertion of 
the Presidential Auteur: The Beginning 
or the End 
Released in February of 1947, the 
film The Beginning or the End is the 
first of only three films made over 
a fifty-year period about the use of 
nuclear weapons against Japan.8 It is 
the only one which portrays a sitting 
president: akin to both newsreel 
and biopic, even its title displays its 
confused temporality. The film is a 
potent and rare example of the kind 
of propaganda usually associated 
with totalitarian regimes: to change 
representation one thereby changes 
history. The narrative being enforced is 
that of the decisive president, the locus 
of power in this (new) nuclear age: that 
Truman made… a decision, he is the 
author, of this... with all that it entails. 
As we have seen, his literal authorship 
was eclipsed and subverted on the 
textual field of notes and telegrams; his 
figurative authorship, the master of the 
national narrative, was also at stake. 
The gap that Time’s editors discerned 
in the zeitgeist of this extraordinary 
watershed in American (and world) 
history had to be “repaired”. 
The first in-depth exploration of 
this film was conducted by Robert 
Jay Lifton (1982), one of America’s 
fiercest and most prolific critics of 
the nuclear national security state 
and the “genocidal mentality” which 
it spawned. The film was inspired by 
a letter sent to Donna Reed by one of 
the scientists who had worked on the 
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Manhattan Project; its message was 
that it would have been better to lose 
even a half million lives than unleash 
atomic energy on the world. Hollywood 
was not necessarily the wrong place 
for them to turn, as the “social 
problem film” was still considered a 
viable post-war genre, and we can 
trace its movement from inception to 
completion along these lines.
MGM began the process of 
constructing this film by soliciting 
advice from these scientists and 
gave General Groves and the White 
House script approval. The film’s 
initial purpose, as much as it can be 
surmised from the extant records, 
was to provide a sympathetic account 
of what journalist Walter Lippman 
called the “activist scientists” such 
as Szilard and Oppenheimer. Its 
narrative followed a young scientist 
who is ambivalent about the use of the 
weapon on Hiroshima yet ends up dying 
of radiation exposure while arming the 
weapon. Despite this rather downbeat 
narrative arc, the film manages, in the 
end (and after numerous revisions by 
Groves), to be very upbeat about the 
use of the weapon (never mentioning 
the second bomb, which was dropped 
on Nagasaki without any “order” from 
Truman). 
My specific interest here is to look 
at this rare visualization of Truman 
“deciding” to drop the bomb, a small 
part of the original version of the film 
that had been approved by the White 
House. In this original version, Groves 
and Stimson inform Truman about the 
bomb after FDR’s death, and Truman 
appears to make a “snap judgment” 
about its future use. A select preview 
audience (including Walter Lippman) 
was shocked by this portrayal. Truman’s 
secretary complained about the scene, 
which had been approved by Truman. 
But Walter Lippman, an exemplary 
spectator with “access”, would say of 
the scene that it reduced the role of the 
president
“to extreme frivolity in a great 
matter. Serious people abroad are 
bound to say that if that is the way 
we made that kind of a decision, 
we are not to be trusted with such 
a powerful weapon. As you know, 
the decision was not made that 
way.” (LIFTON and MITCHELL, 
1995: 363)
Assistant Secretary of War John 
McCloy responded by asserting that 
“such a misrepresentation would 
greatly complicate some of the thinking 
which is now current about the bomb” 
(LIFTON and MITCHELL, 1995: 363).
In response, MGM immediately set 
out to re-write and then re-shoot it. 
The new version was set in Potsdam, 
replete with the expected trappings of 
power (mise-en-scène, the backdrop 
of Potsdam agreement, that text which 
was Truman’s inaugural encounter with 
history; a heavy-handed discursiveness 
to “explain” the bombing), and staged 
an extended exchange between Truman 
and his secretary, Charles Ross, ending 
with this dialogue:
Ross:  As President of the United 
States, sir, you could make no other 
decision.
Truman: As President, I could not. So 
I have instructed the Army to take the 
bomb to the Marianas and – when they 
get the green light – to use it. (LIFTON 
and MITCHELL, 1995: 364) 
Lippman’s extreme discomfort 
over the representation of Truman’s 
“decision” caused the White House 
to re-think the narrative arc of the 
president’s portrayal and was an 
important factor in the reconsideration 
of the actor who played him. The 
original actor, Roman Bohnen, was 
deemed “not military enough” in 
demeanor, and a new actor, Art Baker, 
was chosen to replace him. All of this 
is, perhaps, in retrospect self-evidently 
comical and transparently useless. 
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Yet it is this logic, the logic of the 
Leviathan’s locus in the president, in 
the man, that governs all subsequent 
evaluative models of the presidency to 
this day. 
Conclusion
What we see in this account 
is that the film didn’t matter: the 
effort to re-insert an “auteur”, an 
author, confidently in control of the 
narrative, is clumsy and ineffective, 
a perfect example of Truman (and 
his representatives) misreading 
the portrait of the Leviathan, if you 
will – the nuclear Leviathan has left 
them far behind. The momentary 
instability of Truman’s portrait shows 
us with uncanny accuracy the crypt, 
which would seal this and all future 
presidents within its self-perpetuating 
apparatus. The listless, static, and 
hopeless President portrayed on the 
1945 Time “Man of the Year” cover was 
a sign (however fleeting) of the scale of 
the dislocation of power that occurred 
under the auspices of a war that was 
also not a war, a permanent “state of 
exception”: the Cold War.
This brief exposure of the absence 
of presidential control, however, would 
prove to be one of the final times it 
would be so dramatically evident. 
Since then, and beginning with the 
re-casting of Truman’s own portrait 
as his presidency continued, the Cold 
War power apparatus has worked 
assiduously to reinscribe the myth of 
presidential agency as the locus of the 
American Leviathan on the popular 
imagination. The proliferation of media 
technology since the end of World War 
II has served to reinforce the mask, to 
refine and burnish the portrait rather 
than to illuminate the reality behind it.
This continuing effort reached its 
culmination in the figure of Ronald 
Reagan. The widespread acceptance 
of such a self-evident cipher as the 
symbol of strength and decisiveness 
ensured that such a glimpse of the 
absent face/place of power would 
never occur again. The portrait and 
body of the president as the Leviathan’s 
decisive enforcer of order and stability 
was firmly in place. The fact that the 
attempt on Reagan’s life in 1981 served 
to provide not another revelation of 
this massive dislocation of power, 
but rather to solidify the image of the 
president’s character as the source of 
power and authority, underscores this 
point.
In light of our current situation 
and the extreme and (intentionally?) 
unstable personality that composes 
the presidential portrait of Donald 
Trump, we may do well to remember 
that the underlying truth has not 
changed. The apparatus that is the 
trans-personal, trans-temporal locus of 
power has not changed, and fixing our 
focus on the mask, on the particulars 
of the individual, either by idolizing 
or demonizing him, may serve only to 
distract us from the power structure we 
really need to understand.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my editor and friend Bri-
gham Taylor, as well as the Comparative Cinema 
editors, for their invaluable assistance comple-
ting this manuscript.
1/ Freud’s analysis of screen memories is particularly potent given the correspon-
dence between dream and screen perception, as much as the manner in which 
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powerful imagery can function to mask, or screen out, trauma.
2/ NSC 68 was a document of over sixty pages of recommendations by the National 
Security Council to President Truman. Sheldon Wolin’s stunning new history of the 
Cold War details how shocking this shift was. Cf. pp. 27-35, for starts. At its heart is 
the establishment of an even larger, and more secret, national security apparatus 
and intensification of the nuclear weapons program.
3/ See Michel Foucault’s work on governmentality and the Leviathan, which forms 
the basis of this work: in particular Society Must Be Defended. Santner offers a fas-
cinating analysis of the tension produced by the “royal remains” of sovereignty (the 
flesh of the sovereign as it is translated to the “body politic” in The Royal Remains: 
The People’s Two Bodies and the Endgames of Sovereignty [SANTNER, 2011]). See also 
Derrida’s The Beast and the Sovereign (DERRIDA, 2017) which explores the connects 
between animality and sovereignty.
4/ This legitimization occurs through what Foucault describes as the “juridical” 
theory of power: “In the case of the classical juridical theory of power, power is 
regarded as a right which can be possessed in the way one possesses a commodity.” 
(FOUCAULT, 2003: 13)
5/ See Hans Belting’s fascinating recent study of the face and, in particular, the 
transformation of the “public” face in the U.S. by Henry Luce, owner of Time and Life. 
Belting writes in regard to Life’s display of faces on its cover that “the layout of the 
magazine conveys the impression that the news and its bonus of topicality are res-
ponsible when a medium (itself faceless) attracts ever-new faces to it – faces that 
continually replace one another as masks.” (BELTING, 2017: 178)
6/ Just a sample would include Richard Neustadt (on presidential power), Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. (on excessive presidential power) and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (on the 
“advertising” of presidents).
7/ He is referring to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia formalizing the end to the Thirty 
Years’ War, which was brought on by weak nation-states and religious enmity. Ho-
bbes’s treatise on the Leviathan, written three years later, provides the figure of a 
powerful leader which ends war through the monopolization of violence. 
8/ The other two are: Above and Beyond (Melvin Frank, 1952) about Col. Tibbets, the 
pilot who dropped the first bomb on Hiroshima, and Fat Man and Little Boy (Roland 
Joffé, 1989): like The Beginning or the End, the latter spends most of its screen time 
on the Manhattan Project, and ends with the detonation of the first bomb in the Trini-
ty test. The presidential decision is off-screen, the drama is in the scientists develo-
pment of the weapon.
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